Canada’s Nuclear Industry Is Losing Strategic Direction

Canada’s Nuclear Industry Is Losing Strategic Direction by Maj (ret’d) CORNELIU, CHISU, CD, PMSC FEC, CET, P.Eng. Former Member of Parliament Pickering-Scarborough East Canada is entering a period in which nuclear energy will be essential to electricity security, industrial growth and national sovereignty. Yet the country risks expanding nuclear generation without adequately protecting the technology, manufacturing capacity, fuel cycle and intellectual property that made Canada a leading nuclear nation. Canada possesses major uranium resources, a respected regulatory system, an experienced workforce and the internationally proven CANDU reactor. These are strategic national assets. However, public policy increasingly favours foreign-controlled reactor designs without sufficient consideration of the long-term consequences for Canadian ownership, domestic production and security of supply. Ontario’s choices are particularly important. The province is the centre of Canada’s nuclear industry, and its CANDU stations at Bruce, Darlington and Pickering have supplied dependable electricity for decades. They also created a sophisticated Canadian network of engineers, manufacturers, fuel producers and specialized contractors. Despite this history, Ontario has placed the American-Japanese GE Hitachi BWRX-300 at the centre of its new nuclear program. Ontario Power Generation intends to build four small modular reactors at Darlington. The BWRX-300 may prove to be a capable reactor. The issue is not that Ontario should reject foreign technology. International cooperation is normal and necessary in the nuclear sector. The concern is that Ontario appears unusually receptive to foreign technology without demonstrating that it has fully examined the consequences for Canadian nuclear sovereignty. A nuclear reactor is not an ordinary equipment purchase. It creates a relationship lasting 60 years or more and involving intellectual property, software, fuel, replacement components, specialized maintenance and continuing technical support. Ontario should therefore disclose more than the value of contracts awarded to provincial companies. It should explain who controls the reactor design, where the most valuable systems will be manufactured, what licensing obligations will apply and whether Canadian firms will obtain lasting rights to manufacture and export important components. There is a major difference between Canadian companies participating in a foreign-controlled supply chain and Canada controlling the technology itself. Fuel security must also be considered. CANDU reactors operate with natural uranium and benefit from an established Canadian fuel cycle. The BWRX-300 requires enriched uranium, introducing dependence on foreign enrichment capacity and international supply arrangements. Canada has abundant uranium, but it does not currently possess commercial enrichment capability. It is difficult to describe a strategy as fully sovereign when Canadian uranium may have to leave the country for enrichment before returning as reactor fuel. Ontario must also explain how its enthusiasm for foreign SMRs will affect the future of CANDU technology. If Canada’s largest nuclear province does not support a new generation of CANDU reactors, international customers may reasonably question why they should do so. A reactor technology cannot remain internationally competitive without a committed domestic reference customer. Ontario should therefore evaluate the next-generation CANDU alongside foreign SMRs, not treat Canadian technology as a secondary option to be preserved by the federal government or another province. The location of the first SMR fleet also raises an important strategic question. Why is it being built at Darlington rather than at a new site supporting development of Northern Ontario and the Ring of Fire? Darlington offers clear practical advantages. It is an established nuclear site with trained personnel, existing transmission infrastructure, emergency-planning systems and community familiarity with nuclear operations. These factors reduce the risk of constructing a first-of-a-kind reactor. For that reason, building the first BWRX-300 at Darlington is understandable from a project-management perspective. However, Ontario’s nuclear strategy should extend beyond the easiest existing site. The Ring of Fire contains major deposits of critical minerals needed for batteries, advanced manufacturing, defence systems and modern energy technologies. Developing these resources will require reliable electricity, roads, communications and significant new infrastructure. A small modular reactor could eventually provide dependable, low-carbon power for mines, mineral-processing facilities and northern communities. It could help transform the Ring of Fire from a remote extraction zone into a broader Canadian industrial region. Without adequate local energy, minerals may be extracted and shipped elsewhere for processing, leaving Ontario and Canada with only a fraction of the potential economic benefit. A northern nuclear project could support mineral refining, battery-material production, transportation infrastructure, housing and public services. It could also create opportunities for Indigenous ownership, skilled employment and long-term regional development. This does not mean that the first Darlington reactor should simply be relocated. A new northern nuclear site would require extensive environmental assessment, regulatory approval, transportation infrastructure and genuine consultation and partnership with affected First Nations. The electricity demand of future mines and processing facilities would also need to be established. A northern project therefore may not be ready on the same timetable as Darlington. However, Ontario should already be conducting a formal feasibility study for SMR development connected to the Ring of Fire. That study should examine possible sites, projected industrial electricity demand, transmission requirements, transportation access, environmental impacts and Indigenous equity participation. The objective should not be merely to provide electricity to one mine. It should be to create the energy foundation for a northern industrial corridor. Canada must avoid repeating the same strategic mistake in both mining and nuclear energy: exporting raw materials while importing the highest-value technologies and finished products. It makes little sense for Canada to export uranium, rely on foreign enrichment and purchase foreign reactor technology while also exporting critical minerals for processing abroad. Such an approach would leave the country at the lower end of two strategic supply chains. Nuclear energy, critical minerals and advanced manufacturing should be treated as parts of one national industrial strategy. Governments should establish meaningful Canadian-content requirements for publicly supported nuclear projects. These requirements should apply not only to construction labour but also to engineering, software, control systems, fuel services and long-term component manufacturing. Foreign-designed projects should include technology-transfer provisions and plans to establish Canadian production of critical systems. Strategically important Canadian nuclear suppliers should also be protected from acquisitions that could move intellectual property, production or decision-making outside the country. At the same time, Canada must maintain a viable domestic future for CANDU technology. Ontario need not choose exclusively between CANDU reactors and SMRs. Different technologies may serve different purposes. Large CANDU reactors could provide dependable baseload generation using Canadian natural uranium, while SMRs could serve smaller grids, industrial developments and remote regions. The central requirement is that foreign technology complement Canadian capability rather than gradually replace it. Darlington may be the practical site for the first BWRX-300, but it should not define the limits of Ontario’s nuclear vision. Future reactors should be considered not only where construction is easiest, but where they can advance national priorities. That includes opening Northern Ontario, developing the Ring of Fire, processing critical minerals in Canada and creating durable partnerships with Indigenous communities. Nuclear energy is more than an electricity source. It is an instrument of industrial policy, regional development, energy security and national independence. Canada must decide whether it intends to remain a sovereign nuclear nation or become primarily a supplier of uranium, public financing and construction sites for technologies controlled elsewhere. That decision is being made now, and Ontario is at its centre.