Afghanistan the new Vietnam

Afghanistan the new Vietnam by Maj (ret'd) CORNELIU E. CHISU, CD, PMSC, FEC, CET, P. Eng. Former Member of Parliament Pickering-Scarborough East It seems that we have learned nothing from the past. The quick failure of Afghanistan is a repeat of the failure of the intervention in Vietnam. On April 29 1975 the evacuation of Saigon was very similar to the evacuation of Kabul in August 2021. After almost a half century and two generations, we are getting the same result. The problem in Afghanistan started with the Soviet invasion on Christmas day in 1979 and ended in mid February 1989 with the withdrawal of the Soviet troops. The Soviet Union intervened in support of the Afghan communist government in its conflict with anti-communist Muslim guerrillas. The aim of the Soviet operation was to prop up their new but faltering client state, headed by leader Babrak Karmal. However, Karmal was unable to attain significant popular support. Backed by the United States, the mujahideen rebellion grew, spreading to all parts of the country. The Soviets initially left the suppression of the rebellion to the Afghan army, but the latter was beset by mass desertions and remained largely ineffective throughout the war. The Afghan War quickly settled down into a stalemate, with more than 100,000 Soviet troops controlling the cities, larger towns, and major garrisons and the mujahideen moving with relative freedom throughout the countryside. Soviet troops tried to crush the insurgency by various tactics, but the guerrillas generally eluded their attacks. The Soviets then attempted to eliminate the mujahideen's civilian support by bombing and depopulating the rural areas. These tactics sparked a massive flight from the countryside; by 1982 some 2.8 million Afghans had sought asylum in Pakistan, and another 1.5 million had fled to Iran. The mujahideen were eventually able to neutralize Soviet air power through the use of shoulder-fired antiaircraft missiles supplied by the Soviet Union's Cold War adversary, the United States. Now back to the future. In 2021, after a presence for 20 years of US lead NATO troops including our Canadian Forces, the result is the same as the Soviets then experienced. The quick disintegration of the Afghan Army supposedly trained by the US and its NATO allies is the failure of an intervention ill conceived and ill managed with lives and resources lost to a cause that was unclear from the beginning. Saigon 1975 (United States), Kabul 1989 (Soviets), Kabul 2021 (US and NATO) seems that something went wrong in that part of the world and that the leaders of the western world just gloriously ignored the lessons of history. No one thought in 2021 that by mid-August the Taliban would be in Kabul. The Taliban's ability to link their cause to the very meaning of being Afghan, was a crucial factor in America's defeat. For Afghans, jihad, better translated as "resistance" or "struggle", has historically been a means of defense against oppression by outsiders, part of their endurance against invader after invader since the time of Alexander the Great. In more recent times, they have first exhausted, then repelled the British, the Soviets and now the Americans. The 'forever war' for Americans was also a long war for Canadians. Never mind that apparently the NATO decision to invoke, for the first time, the collective security provisions of Article Five - that an attack on one is an attack on all - was the initiative of then Canadian NATO ambassador David Wright. That decision launched the US-led NATO intervention that is only now concluding in a controlled disaster. As a result, more than 40,000 Canadian soldiers served in Afghanistan including myself in 2007, with 158 killed between 2001 and 2014. More came home injured or psychologically wounded, and the Canadian Armed Forces reported that as a follow up 191 veterans have taken their own lives since 2011. It is a sad story for generations of Afghani people and a sad result of the Canadian efforts to try to build a responsible society. The Afghan experience is a cautionary tale for future Canadian interventions. The western experience in Afghanistan will oblige policy-makers to think hard about future interventions. Without an appreciation of the history, culture, geography and local politics, we may win battles but we lose the war. As the evacuation of Afghani who worked and supported the Canadian Forces continue at this moment it is a time to reflect. Unlike during the Cold War when Canada was a leading middle power within one of two bounded geopolitical blocs, today it faces the prospect of becoming a marginal state in an integrated - yet pluralistic - international order of global scope. The new era and the rapidly evolving world calls for a Canadian foreign policy that requires a drastic change in attitude. We need to embrace pragmatism over ideology, and strategic thinking over the endless invocation of platitudes. Canada's second consecutive failure in our bid for a UN Security Council seat should make us rethink the notion that the world cares at all about who we are. We need to have qualified people in leadership positions, be proactive internationally, regain the edge we have lost in science and technology and develop expertise in diplomacy. It is time to start the Great Canadian Awakening both domestically and internationally!